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RUNNING AHEAD: OPINION TRANSMISSION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion Transmission in Organizations: An Agent-Based Modelling Approach  
 
Juliette Rouchier 
Paola Tubaro 
Cécile Emery 
OPINION TRANSMISSION IN ORGANIZATIONS: 
AN AGENT-BASED MODELING APPROACH 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper builds a theoretical framework to detect the conditions under which social influence 
enables persistence of a shared opinion among members of an organization over time, despite 
membership turnover. It develops agent-based simulations of opinion evolution in an advice network, 
whereby opinion is defined in the broad sense of shared understandings on a matter that is relevant for 
an organization’s activities, and on which members have some degree of discretion. We combine a 
micro-level model of social influence that builds on the “relative agreement” approach of Deffuant et 
al. (2002), and a macro-level structure of interactions that includes a flow of joiners and leavers and 
allows for criteria of advice tie formation derived from, and grounded in, the empirical literature on 
intra-organizational networks. 
 We provide computational evidence that persistence of opinions over time is possible in an 
organization with joiners and leavers, a result that depends on circumstances defined by mode of 
network tie formation (in particular, criteria for selection of advisors), individual attributes of agents 
(openness of newcomers to influence, as part of their socialization process), and time-related factors 
(turnover rate, which regulates the flow of entry and exit in the organization, and establishes a form of 
endogenous hierarchy based on length of stay). We explore the combined effects of these factors and 
discuss their implications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Opinions, defined as shared understandings on matters that are relevant for an organization’s 
activities, and on which members have some degree of discretion, often display remarkable persistence 
in organizational contexts. Such persistence is intriguing if we consider the centrifugal forces, such as 
time and membership turnover, which may threaten the stability of any consensual outcome (Harrison 
& Carroll, 1991). Under the constant pressure of time and membership turnover, how can we explain 
that some opinions persist in organizations while in other cases, two or more opinions coexist in the 
same organization? It is thus important to elucidate the process of transmission of opinions over time 
and across cohorts, above and beyond the common understanding that it ultimately relies on social 
influence – namely the change in an individual’s thoughts, opinions or behaviors that arises from 
interpersonal interactions (Rashotte, 2007). 
In recent years, a growing body of research has endeavored to identify the conditions under 
which, over time, social influence taking place at micro (dyadic) level gives rise to macro patterns of 
transmission and diffusion through repeated iterations (Rousseau, 2011). These patterns differ 
depending on initial conditions (e.g., number of members, initial opinions), intensity of influence and 
modes of interaction, and may give rise to consensus around a single opinion, polarization between 
two opposing groups of opinion, or fragmentation into multiple, separate opinion clusters. Agent-
based computer simulation has been extensively used to model dynamic processes in which consensus, 
polarization or fragmentation appear as emergent properties of the social system, owing to endogenous 
feedback effects arising from multiple, repeated interactions between individuals who influence one 
another. With heterogeneous populations, influences may spread from one subset of agents to others, 
under given conditions (Deffuant, 2006; Deffuant, Amblard, Weisbuch & Faure, 2002; Deffuant, 
Neau, Amblard & Weisbuch, 2001; Gargiulo & Mazzoni, 2008; Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Jager & 
Amblard, 2004; Kułakowski, 2009; Malarz, Gronek & Kułakowski, 2011).  
Agent-based simulation involves the generation of an artificial society to identify the 
conditions under which given factors suffice to produce some social phenomenon of interest – here, 
the possibility that an opinion is persistently shared in a group, even after the individuals who 
originated this opinion have left the group. The outcomes of the simulation enable to assess the 
coherence and completeness of the description of the phenomenon and the initial assumptions – here, 
micro-level social influence. This approach does not exclude alternative representations of the same 
phenomenon, but provides a consistency test of the proposed interpretation of it (Epstein, 2006). A 
model thus requires a dual assessment (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005): that the micro-behavior is logically 
sound (see the discussion of Deffuant, Weisbuch, Amblard & Faure, 2003) and that the patterns that 
emerge are meaningful concerning the issue at stake (Grimm, Berger, Bastiansen, Eliassen, et al., 
2006). 
Within this literature, the “relative agreement” model of Deffuant et al. (2002), whose 
representation of opinion is capable of accounting for nuances and comprises a measure of openness to 
influence, has become a standard reference (Rouchier, 2013). Many researchers have re-used it for 
further analysis, developing variants and refinements (Fortunato, 2004; Jager & Amblard, 2004; 
Amblard & Deffuant, 2006; Kozma & Barrat, 2008, to name just a few). Even its terminology, using 
the term “opinion” to cover a wide range of behaviors and attitudes that can be subject to influence, 
has imposed itself, supplanting the older use of “culture” (Axelrod, 1997). So far, these models have 
mostly been applied to political issues such as societal cleavages and spread of extremisms (Rolfe, 
2009). In this article, we endeavor to further extend Deffuant’s model to allow purposeful application 
to organization studies. 
Indeed, the results already obtained in previous research do not transfer easily to 
organizational settings, for two reasons. First, extant models ignore membership turnover, an 
important property of real-world organizations and a basic mechanism through which they evolve. In 
any given period, some members leave the organization while some newcomers join. Newcomers 
possibly bring with them new opinions, which may challenge any previously established opinion. 
Second, this literature represents the structure of interactions within which social influence takes place 
as sheer random matching, without considering more plausible relational forms. Yet literature on 
organizations points out that influence is most likely channeled through the internal network of 
communication, knowledge-sharing, and advice-seeking among members (Krackhardt & Hanson, 
1993). Selection of advisors depends on criteria that are specific to organizational contexts, depending 
on both the formal structure of an organization (seniority levels for example) and informal factors 
(perceived competency of members, inter-individual similarities), with potential consequences on the 
spread of opinions through social influence. 
Our thought on these issues has been inspired by a real-world case study, mapping normative 
opinions and advice networks at the Commercial Court of Paris (Lazega & Mounier, 2003). A five-
century old judicial institution in charge of a large number of commercial litigation and bankruptcy 
cases including some high-profile ones, the Court is an elected body, where members are not career 
magistrates but experienced businesspeople or top-level company managers whose mandates are for a 
fixed term of up to 14 years – thus implying a regular turnover, with joiners and leavers every year. In 
this setting, judges with more senior positions appeared to differ in their views (opinions) from more 
junior judges. When facing such a stylized fact in a complex system, two types of hypothesis can be 
made: (i) either judges learn, individually, what opinion is most useful in that context, and change 
their view over time; (ii) or there exists some form of social influence in the Court, so that the views of 
newcomers gradually converge towards the stance that is held at the top. We focus on this second 
hypothesis, aiming to establish the extent to which emergence and persistence of shared opinions 
within this institution could result from a collective learning process. Available empirical evidence 
supports this approach: indeed a dataset of the advice network of judges, collected at three points in 
time (2000, 2002 and 2005), reveals a correlation between network structure, formal hierarchy of the 
institution (in particular, its division into Chambers, annual rotation of members across Chambers, 
rules of attribution of senior management roles) and normative views, which could hardly result from 
random matching; Rouchier & Tubaro (2011) show that an agent-based simulation based on 
Deffuant’s model and modified to include membership turnover, but still assuming randomness in the 
formation of inter-personal ties, does not fit the data well. Instead, other factors are found to play a 
role in network tie formation, notably seniority and the internal hierarchy of the institution, as well as 
homophily, including opinion homophily (Lazega, Lemercier & Mounier 2006; Lazega, Mounier & 
Tubaro 2011; Lazega, Mounier, Snijders & Tubaro 2012). 
 The present article abstracts from this particular empirical case to build a more universal 
approach, suitable to the study of organizations in general. We aim to offer a way forward to further 
applications to organizational contexts – a minimal model design which, however simple, is general 
enough to authorize subsequent customization and adaptation to a wide range of organizational 
structures. Thus, we take out the specificities of the Paris Court (such as its division into Chambers, 
and annual Chamber rotation) to retain only the elements that the broad management and 
organizational literature confirms to be commonly found, notably turnover and the identification of 
key drivers of intra-organizational advice network tie formation. In this sense, we situate our work in 
the tradition of, among others, March (1991), Harrison and Carroll (1991) and Carroll  and Harrison 
(1998), who all base their models on computer simulation, but derive their assumptions from 
established theoretical and empirical literature.  
 Our model is at a high level of abstraction, and is meant primarily to support theory generation 
(Epstein, 2006), so that it cannot be empirically tested as it is. Rather, we consider it as a first step in a 
long-run effort to develop a family of analytical tools that benefit from the insight accumulated in the 
agent-based literature, while offering a fit-for-purpose framework of analysis, and allowing sufficient 
flexibility for subsequent tailoring to specific organizational case studies (Amblard, Bommel & 
Rouchier, 2007). The model also contributes to agent-based modeling research per se because, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is the first to offer theoretical results on populations with entry and exit of 
members over time. 
 Along these lines, we adopt a deliberately simplified representation of opinion that leaves 
aside the specific contents that organization members discuss. In line with the agent-based modeling 
tradition, we interpret opinion in the broad sense of a shared understanding on a matter that is relevant 
for the organization’s activities, and on which members have some degree of discretion. This 
definition stresses the potential durability of opinion and its possible acceptance by the whole 
membership, while allowing for minor variations at the individual level. We focus on how opinion can 
be transmitted from existing members to new ones, so as to be sustained in the long run, regardless of 
the views that newcomers may have held prior to joining.  
OPINION TRANSMISSION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
Understanding how opinions are transmitted in an organization from generation to generation 
requires uncovering the mechanisms of social influence among organizational members. Social 
influence can flow through social networks (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Rashotte, 2007; Friedkin, 
1998). Within organizations, advice networks are particularly important channels for influence (e.g. 
Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993; McDonald & Westphal, 2003). An advice network is defined as “the 
pattern of relations among [organizational] members in which one member seeks advice from another 
member” (Athanassiou & Nigh, 1999: 86) and develops over time as organizational members seek 
assistance, guidance, information, and opportunities for problem solving (Gibbons, 2004). Advice 
networks have been studied to understand knowledge transmission (Reagans & McEvily, 2003), 
changes of organizational strategies (McDonald & Westphal, 2003), changes in attitude toward 
technology (Burkhardt, 1994) and status differentials (Lazega et al., 2012).  
We build a framework under which social influence channeled by an advice network enables 
emergence of a shared opinion among members of an organization over time, despite membership 
turnover. By doing so, we extend the model of Deffuant et al. (2002). In light of extant management 
and organization literature, we discuss how three dimensions of advice networks contribute to driving 
opinion dynamics: selection of advisors, newcomers' openness to influence (which we call “latitude of 
acceptance”, following Jager & Amblard, 2004), and turnover rate. 
Effects of advisor selection 
The first dimension is the advice network selection criterion adopted by individuals when 
seeking advice, knowledge, and information from others. We consider two criteria that can 
significantly impact opinion transmission in organizations through social influence mediated by advice 
ties: experience and homophily. 
Experience. Individuals often seek advice from members who have been in the institution for a 
long time, especially when this is most likely to increase knowledge and expertise. Indeed, if people 
select advisors according to expected work-related input (i.e., they want competent persons) and if 
time spent in the organization increases competence at least in certain matters (e.g. knowing how 
things work internally, what procedures and rules to follow in different circumstances, who is 
responsible for what task, etc.), then more senior people are likely to be more sought out for advice 
(Comer, 1991; Settoon & Adkins, 1997; Slaughter & Zickar, 2006).  
If “individuals may change an opinion under the influence of another who is perceived to be an 
expert in the matter at hand” (Rashotte 2007: 4426), then advice from a supposedly expert more senior 
member transmits specialized information as well as attitudes, beliefs, and values to a non-expert (Hill 
& Carley, 2008; Morrison, 2002), and may modify the opinion of the latter. Along these lines, we 
model a tendency of agents to seek advice from more experienced colleagues, and to be potentially 
subject to influence by them. 
Homophily. Individuals may also seek advice from those they know hold similar opinions, which 
is a way to represent value homophily. A large body of literature in social psychology suggests that 
similarity enhances friendship, the desire to provide social support (McDonald & Whestphal, 2003) 
and empathy (Westphal & Milton, 2000). In organizations, the work of Ibarra (1992) first revealed that 
similarities enhance relationships. Although there are several dimensions along which similarities may 
exist (gender, nationality, native language, educational background, etc.), we look only at one specific 
dimension, namely opinion or value similarity. Members sharing common values have an additional 
cognitive motivation for seeking advice from one another; they will more easily approach one another 
for advice (possibly lowering the effects of status); and they may trust advisors more. Advisors may be 
more willing to provide advice in order to gain support for their opinions (Centola, González-Avella, 
Eguíluz & San Miguel, 2007; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
One may think that when mediated by homophilous ties, social influence will necessarily lead to 
formation of sub-groups, each with its own opinion and separate from others. However, the agent-
based literature has shown that different outcomes are possible, all the more so in a system that 
evolves over time. Gargiulo and Mazzoni (2008) provide evidence that homophilous choices may 
allow for emergence of consensus, while Kozma and Barrat (2008) show that fragmentation may occur 
in static networks, but not in dynamic networks where homophily can only lead to consensus or 
polarization. By including value-homophilous choice of advisors in our model with turnover, we aim 
to draw conclusions about the possibility to generalize these previous results. 
We treat experience and homophily as two separate criteria for advisor selection in our system, 
and we also combine them in an effort to fit to a plausible representation of human choice, thereby 
increasing the credibility of the model. By so doing, we extend the effort undertaken in recent 
literature (Harrison & Carroll, 2002; Kozma & Barrat, 2008) to incorporate more realistic selection 
criteria in agent-based models, so as to overcome the simplifying, but unrealistic assumption that 
agents are equally likely to form ties with anyone else. 
Effects of latitude of acceptance of newcomers 
The process of social influence especially affects newcomers into an organization (Rice & Aydin, 
1991; Schein, 2003; Bauer, Bodner, Erdongan, Truxillo & Tucker, 2007). Unsure of their role and 
apprehensive about their status, newcomers aim to build a situational definition (Schein, 2003). They 
seek information and advice through different communication channels (e.g., social interactions with 
supervisors and peers - Saks & Ashforth, 1997) to refine their understanding of the organization in 
terms of norms, opinions, policies, or power. They can thus “diagnose and interpret the many surprises 
they encounter” (Bauer et al., 2007: 709) and reduce the uncertainty surrounding their new 
organizational environment.   
We therefore introduce a “latitude of acceptance” variable representing willingness to be 
influenced by others (or equivalently, lack of individual self-confidence). We allow latitude of 
acceptance to vary with time spent in an organization in order to account for the observed differences 
between newcomers and more senior organization members. Because of newcomers’ need to reduce 
uncertainty, they are likely more open to social influence, while the extent to which they are ready to 
accept others’ opinions diminishes over time, as they gain confidence and knowledge of the 
organizational environment in which they operate. While the latitude of acceptance always decreases 
with time spent in the organization, it may start from different initial levels depending on a variety of 
external circumstances that affect newcomers’ attitudes but are hardly under the control of the 
organization. We expect lower levels of initial acceptance (i.e., lower willingness to be influenced by 
others) to result in a smaller amount of influence in the system, which in turn decreases the likelihood 
of a common opinion; yet these effects may also depend on other dimensions of the system, notably tie 
formation criteria, and may vary with the flow of turnover.  
Effects of Membership Duration 
Turnover is likely to significantly affect organizations. People join and leave, and the time 
members spend within the organization will affect the socialization of others, as well as their influence 
on others. At micro-level, turnover changes the structural properties of an organizational advice 
network: as people enter and leave an organization, advice networks reconfigure themselves. 
Krackhardt and Porter (1985) investigated the effect of turnover on the attitudes of organizational 
members who remain in the organization. They found that the closer employees were to those who 
left, the more satisfied and committed they became. At macro-level, Harrison and Carroll (1991, 2006) 
simulated joiners and leavers who affect each other’s enculturation through a social network, revealing 
that an emergent organizational property is the cultural heterogeneity of the organization.  
We thus investigate the effects of duration of membership on opinion transmission. Notice that 
with a fixed-size population, duration of membership is perfectly equivalent to membership renewal 
rate: a low number of entries and exits implies that it takes relatively long before the initial population 
is entirely replaced, and members remain in the organization for a relatively long time; with the same 
organization size, higher flows of joiners and leavers imply a shorter duration of membership. Overall, 
we expect the process of social influence to be less effective in harmonizing members’ views with 
higher flows of joiners and leavers (or shorter durations of membership), so that a shared opinion may 
not emerge, or not be stable.  
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We develop an agent-based simulation model of social influence over an advice network with 
changing composition in the form of a flow of joiners and leavers. The model addresses the two 
interrelated issues of the process through which opinions may change in bilateral (dyadic) meetings, 
and the global structure of interactions that determine which agent meets which other agent (Friedkin 
& Johnsen, 1999). Our account of social influence at dyadic level remains very close to the “relative 
agreement” model of Deffuant et al. (2002), apart from a detail (see below); we also follow this 
literature in defining heterogeneities in the population of interest, and focusing on the influence of one 
part of the population on the others. We change the global structure of interactions, though, by 
removing the simplifying assumptions of fixed population and of random selection: these are our main 
innovations relative to the agent-based modeling tradition.  
The dynamics of the model involves a population of fixed size, where each agent who leaves is 
replaced by a new agent, with an update at every time-step. Agents interact ten times at each step and 
each interaction potentially leads to individuals' evolution of opinions1. At the end of each step we 
observe agents’ opinions; more precisely, we observe the average over the whole population as well as 
the evolution in each agent’s own history. Let us now turn to the specification of our model. We 
describe how we model agents’ attributes, the process of social influence, the process of advice tie 
formation, and the simulation structure and outcomes.  
Agents' attributes 
Each agent i is endowed with three attributes: age, opinion, and latitude of acceptance, which are 
used to formalize the social processes of advice tie formation and social influence. These three 
attributes are given at initialization, and may evolve over time. 
Age ( tia ) is the number of time-steps that agent i has already spent in the organization at time t. 
Age varies between 1 and total membership duration D, which is an attribute common to all and is a 
defining feature of a simulation. Based on age distribution and membership duration, we can define a 
“generation” as the number of time-steps that must elapse before a population is completely renewed. 
                                                 
1 The time-step is here a stylized representation of the “year” used in the model of the Commercial Court of 
Paris (Rouchier, & Tubaro, 2011), where agents work for ten months every year and are replaced at the end 
of the fourteenth year. We align on this model by assuming one advice-seeking interaction every month.  
The values of age and membership duration also enable distinguishing two groups in the population: 
seniors, whose age is more than half the duration ( tia  >  2
D
), and juniors whose age is lower ( tia  
2
D ). The qualification of senior or junior is not an intrinsic agent parameter and depends on age, 
though it is attributed randomly at initialization, as explained below.  
Opinion is a scalar, continuous variable, defined for agent i at time t as a real number 
t
io   [0; 1].  
Continuity allows individual positions to vary smoothly between extremes, so that nuances can be 
accounted for. In other words, a notion of “distance” between two positions can be defined – 
measuring the extent to which they are close to each other but without requiring them to be identical. 
This formalism also enables identifying clusters of opinions at the system level (see below). 
Latitude of acceptance – a term which we borrow from Jager & Amblard (2004) in place of the 
“uncertainty” of Deffuant et al. (2002) – is also a scalar, continuous variable, defined for agent i at 
time t as 
t
il  [0; 1]. Latitude of acceptance is an indicator of members’ willingness to absorb the 
opinions of others – the agent is indeed able to perceive, and be influenced by, any opinion in its 
“opinion segment” [ tio  - til ; tio  + til ] (Deffuant et al., 2002). In the agent-based literature, this 
attribute expresses agents’ bounded confidence, or the idea that an agent can be influenced by another 
only if their opinions are close enough (Deffuant et al., 2001; Deffuant et al., 2002; Deffuant, 2006; 
Fortunato, 2004; Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Kułakowski, 2009; Malarz, Gronek & Kułakowski, 
2011). Heterogeneous levels of latitude of acceptance are known to substantially affect results 
(Rouchier & Tanimura, 2012).  
Social influence: a variant of the relative agreement model 
Once advisor (i) and advisee (j) have been matched (see below), the advisee can be influenced. In 
line with the bounded-confidence approach, this occurs only if j's opinion is in the opinion segment of 
i, that is: 
t
jo  [ tio  - til ; tio   + til ]. 
If this is true, influence occurs following relative agreement, a measure that is based on the 
overlap of both agents’ opinion segments ( ijh , defined in Eq. 1) relative to the non-overlap (defined in 
Eq. 2), and calculated as overlap minus non-overlap, divided by the length of i's opinion segment 
(defined in Eq. 3). 
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Both j's opinion and j's latitude of acceptance are then transformed through relative agreement, 
weighted by the distance between opinion and parameter ȝ, which settles the speed of adjustment 
between time t and time t + 1. 
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The original mechanism of influence is non-symmetric, so that the agent with larger latitude of 
acceptance will be more influenced than the other. A central tenet of our model is that the asymmetry 
is enhanced: the advisee j is influenced by the advisor i, but not the reverse.  
Advice tie formation: random choice, experience and homophily  
A first mode of advisor selection is pure randomness – agent j probabilistically choosing an 
advisor i among all other agents. Though knowingly unrealistic, this criterion allows comparison with 
results of existing agent-based models, and constitutes a benchmark for other selection criteria. 
We also model advisor selection based on experience, a tendency for agents to seek advice from 
others that joined at the same time as themselves or earlier; put differently, to choose advisors whose 
age is equal to, or higher than, their own. This is a variant of Harrison and Carroll’s cohort effect 
(2002), placing emphasis on time spent in the organization as an indicator of expected insight from 
advice. Choice is random from among the set of agents that meet the criterion.   
The other alternative is value-related homophily, a tendency of individuals to seek advice from 
those with similar opinions. An agent j will select randomly from among the set of agents i such that 
t
jo  [ tio  - til ; tio   + til ]. Because in a dynamic model, opinions may be close at some moment in 
time but diverge afterwards, we also regard as homophilous the choice of agents that influenced the 
advice-seeker in the past, even when their current opinions are distant. To summarize, homophily 
restricts advisor choice to agents that can influence the advice seeker, or influenced it at some earlier 
time. With this restriction, influence will almost always take place, and one can expect to see an 
acceleration of the convergence process, compared to random choice. 
Finally, we combine experience and homophily. In this case, the agent chooses randomly from 
among the agents in the intersection of the two sets.   
Simulation structure 
A simulation consists of a succession of generations, each consisting in D time-steps, where all 
agent interactions occur according to one advisor selection criterion only: random choice, experience, 
homophily, or experience –homophily.  
At initialization, 200 agents are created – the same size of the population considered in Deffuant 
et al. (2002) and in other agent-based literature; comparable with the Commercial Court of Paris 
(about 150 judges); and rather realistic in conjunction with the assumption that all agents can 
potentially interact with all other agents. However, it is acknowledged that population size affects the 
results of the model dynamics, so that caution must be exerted before any generalization.   
As explained above, an agent i is initialized with an age, an opinion and a latitude of acceptance. 
The number of agents for each age is the same, and equal to D
200
, where D is duration of 
membership. We distinguish between senior and junior agents, to create a major element of 
heterogeneity in the population, and explore its effects. Indeed we assume that all senior agents have 
the same opinion and latitude of acceptance, to observe if this initial opinion will durably affect the 
system: they have an opinion of 0.2 and a latitude of acceptance of 0.2, both close to one end of the 
admissible range. Instead, junior agents are initialized with an opinion that is randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution over the [0; 1] real interval, and a latitude of acceptance higher than, or at least 
equal to, 0.2. Subsequently newcomers, who enter the system at each time-step, are defined like initial 
junior agents, with random opinion and larger latitude of acceptance. These parameter values represent 
the idea that senior agents share an orientation towards one extreme of the possible values of opinion 
and are rather self-confident, while juniors are more scattered due to their necessarily diverse 
backgrounds, and more likely to absorb other members’ opinion as part of their socialization process. 
From this starting point, we can observe if opinions converge in the long run toward the value of 0.2 
initially held by seniors – put differently, if the global structure of interactions, mediated by the advice 
network, sustains the initial bias towards a particular opinion. This would indicate that some agents 
(i.e., seniors) are more likely to spread their opinions to others, and that long-term persistence of an 
opinion is indeed possible even with membership turnover. Instead, agents would appear as more 
equal if opinions simply converged towards the midpoint of the acceptable range of opinions (here, 
0.5): this would mean that the initial senior opinion has faded away after some time, and newcomers 
with their more varied views, have been able to exert a substantial influence on the system. In the 
latter case, there would be little need for a model of the structure of interactions that is significantly 
different from random choice and gives greater weight to some agents relative to others: the results 
already obtained in previous agent-based modeling literature would suffice. 
A time-step is made of ten rounds of interactions. In a round, each agent chooses an advisor 
according to the stated criterion. We simulate a parallel choice for all agents at each round, where all 
calculate the influence they incur (if any) and update their opinions. After ten rounds, the new values 
of opinion for each agent are observed, ages are updated, and all agents of age D exit the system, to be 
replaced by newcomers of age 1. The time-step is then over.  
After one generation (D time-steps), all agents that were present at initialization have left, and the 
population has been entirely replaced. We observe the properties of the system after a few generations, 
when the population has been renewed several times; to do so, we use the distinction between seniors 
and juniors to take full account of the dynamics of the model. At this point, only seniors' opinions are 
of interest: they have stayed long enough to have their opinion evolve and reveal if there is still some 
influence of the opinion of those who were seniors at initialization. We observe seniors’ opinions both 
in the medium run (5 generations), and in the long run (50 generations). These long run simulations 
are not meant to represent real-world situations, since it is unlikely that an organization could stay 
unchanged in structure for such a long time. However, they capture the asymptotic behavior of the 
model, and its eventual tendency to converge towards: (i) consensual opinion towards the mean of the 
accepted opinion range, with very quick disappearance of the influence of the initial opinion of 
seniors; (ii) consensual opinion with a value that is eventually near the mean, but after being long 
influenced by the initial setting; (iii) long-lasting influence of the initial setting with consensual 
opinion near 0.2, or polarization around two opposite opinions, one of which is 0.2. These results are 
essential for us to establish the extent to which the initial bias can be stable, as discussed above, and to 
better understand the dynamics of convergence. We thus aim to detect how variations of the different 
parameters induce one or the other of these scenarios. 
To summarize, the values that define one simulation are: advisor selection criterion (random, 
experience, homophily, experience-homophily), latitude of acceptance of juniors and newcomers 
(from 0.2 to 1) and membership duration (from 2 to 50).  Table 1 summarizes our model design. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Indicators 
The most relevant indicator is based on the final opinion of those agents who are senior at the time 
the simulation run is over, that is, those who entered the organization several years before and 
therefore, have been inside for enough time to be influenced by others. Specifically, we observe the 
average and the standard deviation of seniors’ opinions. We also monitor the number of “groups of 
opinion”, or clusters, in which seniors are situated at the end of a simulation run. The groups of 
opinion are defined in the same way as in Deffuant (2006). The method consists in defining a 
minimum distance between the opinions of two agents, below which they are said to belong to the 
same cluster. The clusters are computed as sub-groups of agents such that (i) between any couple of 
agents in the sub-group either the distance of their opinions is below the threshold or (ii) there is 
another agent with intermediate opinion between them. Within this framework, emergence of one 
cluster corresponds to consensus of all agents around a common view, and two or more clusters will 
indicate fragmentation into sub-groups within which members tend to think alike, while divergences 
between sub-groups are insurmountable. We take slightly different values relative to Deffuant (2006), 
with a threshold of 0.05 so that, if one takes any two agents in the group, either the difference between 
their two opinions is lower than 0.05 or there exist agents in the group with intermediary opinion of 
distance less that 0.05 from one of the two. For example, 5 senior agents of opinion 0.24, 0.28, 0.29, 
0.32 and 0.34 form one group; whereas if their opinions are 0.24, 0.28, 0.29, 0.35 and 0.38, then they 
form two groups. It is thus possible to establish if, for a given average opinion, there is consensus, 
polarization or fragmentation. This method has the advantage of relying solely on endogenous criteria 
for the definition of clusters, without requiring the modeler to arbitrarily specify reference values of 
opinion. 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
In all simulations, agents are influenced towards an opinion that they are not the only ones to hold, 
be it only one opinion or several. This is in itself a quite important result, in line with all existing 
agent-based literature on the topic, even though we are the first to introduce turnover.  
Advisor selection criteria 
We first run a set of simulations with different advisor selection criteria, but the same latitude of 
acceptance for newcomers (0.7) and membership duration (10). Figure 1 displays agents as points of 
coordinates equal to their age (horizontal axis) and opinion (vertical axis) after five generations of 10 
time-steps. As usual opinion is allowed to vary between 0 and 1 and in this case, age ranges between 1 
and 10, there are 20 agents for each age level, and senior agents are those with an age between 6 and 
10. Junior agents have rather high latitude of acceptance at the time they join, 0.7, and we explore the 
simulation dynamics for each advisor selection criterion. These results are highly stable: with given 
initial conditions, the resulting dynamics and tendencies are the same in all simulations.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Random. The random choice of advisors yields convergence to a single value that tends to 
coincide with the midpoint of the allowed range of opinions, and does not depend on the initial 
opinion of seniors. This is in line with Deffuant’s results (2002) when all agents start with the 
characteristics of our juniors, independently of turnover. The reason is that with random choice, junior 
and senior agents are equally subject to influence and even newcomers can exert an influence, so that 
the effect of the initial opinion of seniors fades away very quickly. The latitude of acceptance also 
converges to the value of the newcomers, 0.7, due to their possibility to influence seniors as well as to 
be influenced.  
Homophily. Similarly, homophily yields consensus towards the midpoint of the distribution. This 
result is, in fact, predictable, since the possibility of juniors and newcomers to influence seniors is also 
present. The only difference relative to the random rule is that agents only interact with those who can 
influence them, or have influenced them before. Simulations show that this characteristic does not 
change the dynamics in this case.  
Experience and Homophily-Experience. When advice is sought from agents of equal or higher 
age, whether or not in combination with homophily, there is alignment on a value of opinion that is 
close to that of initial senior agents. The experience and homophily-experience rules do not allow 
initial senior agents to be influenced by juniors, while due to their high latitude of acceptance, the 
latter are very influenceable, so that their opinions will gradually tend to get closer to those of seniors. 
The injection of newcomers at each time step does not counter this process as they will themselves 
seek advice from those who have been longer in the organization than themselves, and they will also 
be driven towards the same value of opinion. Their latitude of acceptance changes in this process as 
well and because of influence by senior agents, it tends towards 0.2. In the conditions we set (10 time-
steps for a generation and a rather high latitude of acceptance initially) the initial senior agents have 
the opportunity to influence the organization in the long term when experience matters.  
These tendencies are confirmed in the long run. Figure 2 shows the mean value of opinion and 
latitude of acceptance for senior agents over 50 generations (500 time-steps, with one mean opinion 
and one mean latitude of acceptance recorded at each step). Experience and experience-homophily are 
almost identical regarding these indicators; with these two criteria the initial setting has noticeable 
effects for a number of generations that is higher than what any organization could predictably last. 
Under these conditions, the effect of the initial opinion diminishes over time, almost linearly – there is 
influence, but not strongly enough to steer newcomers rapidly towards the opinion of the initial senior 
agents, so that social reproduction is imperfect.  
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The simulations with random choice and experience confirm existing knowledge of, respectively, 
the internal dynamics of the Deffuant et al. (2002) model, and the importance of seniority structures 
and hierarchy in organizations. Homophily produces more surprising outcomes, and appears as a less 
relevant social process than usually believed: whether or not agents interact more with those who hold 
a similar opinion, seems to matter little for the evolution of their opinions – although we will see later 
that its role is sometimes more complex. 
These first results suggest that for the initial opinion of seniors to be transmitted to later 
generations despite turnover, experience is necessary. Varying the other two parameters will enable us 
to determine the conditions under which this result holds.  
 Effects of latitude of acceptance 
We now run simulations with different levels of juniors' latitude of acceptance (seniors’ latitude of 
acceptance remains equal to 0.2 in all simulations), for each advisor selection criterion and with 
constant membership duration of 10 time-steps. With higher latitude, the opinion diffusion process is 
facilitated and results remain about the same as shown above. With lower latitude of acceptance, the 
opinion diffusion process is made more difficult as junior agents (including newcomers) are less open 
to influence by others, in particular by seniors. Figure 3 shows that in this case, fragmentation and 
polarization of agents into two or more sub-groups of opinion may appear.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Random. With random choice, coexistence of two clusters of opinion is rare since they must be 
separated by at least the value of initial latitude of acceptance – otherwise one group is ultimately 
absorbed by the other, despite some initial noise. There is no convergence with a latitude of 
acceptance of 0.2, polarization around two different opinions with latitude of acceptance of 0.3, and 
convergence to one opinion, corresponding to the midpoint of the distribution, in all other cases. 
Convergence is slow, and accompanied by large deviations with a latitude of acceptance of 0.4 (as 
represented in Figure 3). Generally speaking, the higher the latitude of acceptance, the faster the 
convergence and the less dispersed the opinions, a result that is in line with all other research papers 
using the Deffuant et al. (2002) model.  
Homophily. Homophily enables central convergence to appear sooner than in the case of 
randomness; no second cluster can be created with latitude of acceptance that is at least 0.4. From this 
value until 0.9, increases in initial junior latitude of acceptance do not change the behavior of the 
system, but can only slightly improve convergence and reduce the standard deviation. The effect of 
variations in the levels of juniors' latitude of acceptance is therefore less strong with this selection 
criterion. 
Experience. When junior agents join with a latitude of acceptance that is as low as that of seniors, 
opinions remain very dispersed. Only when there is an initial difference between juniors and seniors 
does some convergence occur. Slightly increasing the latitude of acceptance of newcomers produces 
two groups, one being quite compact around the initial senior opinion of 0.2 and the other, more 
dispersed, around a value of opinion at a distance higher than the latitude of acceptance of newcomers. 
Eventually, the higher the latitude of acceptance of juniors, the less likely this second group is to 
appear and when junior latitude of acceptance exceeds 0.8, all senior agents end up with a final 
opinion very close to 0.2.  
Homophily-Experience. When the latitude of acceptance of newcomers is similar to that of senior 
agents (0.2) there is convergence of opinions, not to a single value but to three different ones. It is the 
restriction of interactions only to agents that can exert an influence that leads to convergence to 
multiple opinions. When latitude of acceptance increases to 0.3, only two groups of opinion form 
(with a distance of opinions that is higher than 0.3). As the latitude of acceptance of newcomers rises 
further, the homophily-experience criterion preserves two groups until the value of latitude of 
acceptance is very large; at and above 0.7, there is only one opinion for all agents, and group behavior 
is very close to experience situations.  
Notice that results with juniors' latitude of acceptance of 0.2 are very similar to those that emerge 
with a fixed population (with no entry and exit of members) as in the original model of Deffuant et al. 
(2002). This value of latitude of acceptance, in fact, minimizes the impact of turnover as it makes 
junior and senior agents more similar. The reason why this effect appears only in homophily 
simulations is that agents in our model do not interact sufficiently often to achieve convergence, unless 
there is an accelerating factor – the homophilous choice which increases the number of influencing 
interactions. 
 The interesting result here is that with lower levels of latitude of acceptance, experience is no 
longer sufficient to preserve consensus around the initial opinion of seniors; it is only when homophily 
is added to it that consensus around the initial seniors’ opinion can emerge, though it is accompanied 
by one or more alternatives. Put differently, under these more difficult conditions, homophily needs to 
be included in order for experience to ensure opinion transmission. This implies that contrary to what 
our very first results on advisor selection suggested (see above), homophily does matter —though in 
more complex ways that could be expected beforehand. 
Effects of membership duration (or turnover rate) 
We now consider different levels of membership duration, for each advisor selection criterion and 
with constant junior latitude of acceptance of 0.7. We take simulation runs of 50 time steps as before. 
The idea is to see if, all other things being equal, the maximum time spent in the organization has 
an impact on the possibility to transmit an opinion to newcomers. As briefly mentioned above, a way 
of thinking about membership duration is the renewal rate of the population. To stay for 10 time-steps 
means that 10% of agents change at every step. To stay for 2 time-steps means that 50% of the 
population is renewed at each time-step, for 4 time-steps - 25%, for 8 time-steps - 12,5%, for 20 time-
steps - 5% and for 50 time-steps 2%. We test the effect of this parameter conditional on advisor 
selection criteria, always under the assumption that agents can interact with others ten times a year.  
Three results hold for all selection criteria. First, renewal of 25 % or 50% of the population (2 or 4 
time steps in the organization, respectively) does not allow the opinion of initial senior agents to be 
transmitted to newcomers; moreover, convergence cannot take place with duration of 2 (see Table 2). 
Second, increasing duration always implies more convergent opinions (with a smaller standard 
deviation, see Table 3). Third, when duration increases (above 20 steps) newcomers get influenced so 
quickly that after 4 time-steps they all are in a range of +/- 0.02 around the convergence value. The 
longer agents stay, the quicker newcomers get influenced. Apart from these three very general results, 
each advisor selection rule displays different characteristics.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
With experience and homophily-experience, higher membership duration leads the final opinion of 
senior agents towards 0.2 (i.e. the value of initial seniors) after 20 or more time-steps. Junior agents 
have an opinion that is very close to 0.2 after just three time-steps spent in the organization. Latitude 
of acceptance is also quite homogeneous and close to the initial latitude of acceptance of seniors, i.e. 
0.2. Exceptions to this general result appear in some of the simulations with experience when duration 
is above 20, when a subgroup of agents is never influenced by the initial opinion of seniors. 
Indeed with experience only, longer durations enable some senior agents to keep a discordant 
opinion (neatly different from 0.2, and typically situated above 0.5) and attract junior agents coming in 
with an opinion in that range, so that a subgroup of agents with opinion above 0.9 persist. Agents are 
divided into two clusters. The discordant-opinion group is small, including about or less than 10% of 
agents as shown in figure 4. Tables 3 and 4 provide details on homogeneity of opinion of the majority 
group and are evidence of the influence of the initial value of seniors’ opinion. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Inclusion of homophily with experience changes the global pattern. Without it, a newcomer with a 
very discordant opinion (notably higher than 0.9, which represents on average 10% of newcomers 
under a uniform distribution), is unlikely to be influenced by more experienced agents (i.e. those who 
joined 3 to 50 time-steps before), most of whom have an opinion of around 0.2. Only when such a 
junior meets agents with opinion higher than 0.9 will it be influenced, and will preserve its discordant 
value of opinion. Hence, these agents constitute a subgroup whose share is stable over time and 
represents about 10% of senior agents at the end. To support this argument, we have run simulations 
with a latitude of acceptance of juniors of 0.7, and a turnover of 2% and 5%, expecting the emergence 
of a subgroup of 19-20 senior agents sharing a discordant opinion. This is indeed the result we obtain 
on average, although the size of the subgroup can rise up until 29 in some simulation runs, in that 
agents with discordant opinion can also influence newcomers with intermediate values of opinion, thus 
increasing their share. Once the proportion is established, it reproduces itself over time since the 
probability to meet each type of more experienced agent generates a probability to be influenced, and 
hence attraction of a part of newcomers.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 This situation is unlikely to arise in simulations where agents interact only with agents that can 
influence them, since they necessarily do get influenced as soon as they join, and that can be either by 
very discordant (high) values or by intermediate values of opinions. As soon as a newcomer is 
influenced by an intermediate value of opinion, its opinion decreases and it becomes subject to 
influence by agents with opinion 0.2, i.e. the vast majority, so that its opinion goes quickly to 0.2. To 
force agents to interact with others only when they can get influenced tends to homogenize the group 
rather than segregate it, which is a pretty counterintuitive result2. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
In sum, longer duration of membership (or equivalently, lower turnover rate) is favorable for 
social influence to occur, and improves the transmission of an initially shared opinion. However, our 
result is asymmetric: shorter durations, corresponding to more difficult conditions for influence to 
                                                 
2  This result also holds when comparing homophily and random simulations, though to a much lesser extent. 
occur, do hinder convergence to seniors’ opinion, as expected; instead with longer durations, 
corresponding to ex ante more favorable conditions, outcomes are conditional on the advisor choice 
criterion (Figure 4). Specifically, experience alone yields polarization around two distinct and separate 
values, one of which is the initial opinion of seniors; experience in conjunction with homophily, 
instead, creates consensus around the initial opinion of seniors. Although there is opinion transmission 
in both cases, it is only when homophily is added to experience that alternatives disappear: again, it 
can be inferred that homophily matters, though its effects are displayed in a somewhat unexpected 
way. It is a sign of the complexity of the system, where the final results depend on combinations of 
initial conditions and modes of interaction, and cannot be predicted based on individual behaviors 
alone. 
These results provide insight into the implications of homophilous selection of advisors on macro-
level opinion transmission. In a system with turnover and asymmetric dyadic influence, homophily 
does not produce polarization as a regular outcome, in contrast to the findings of Kozma and Barrat 
(2008). Rather, our results point to the role of homophily as an accelerating factor, which facilitates 
convergence towards a consensus, whether it is towards the midpoint of the distribution (homophily 
alone) or to the initial opinion of seniors (homophily in conjunction with experience). In particular, it 
is only by adding homophily to experience that opinion transmission is possible when the 
circumstances under which influence occurs become more difficult (lower latitude of acceptance of 
newcomers) or more convoluted (longer durations). Somewhat counter-intuitively, homophily acts as 
a homogenizing factor in these cases, contributing to driving a majority of opinions toward the value 
initially held by seniors, thereby decisively contributing to consensus formation. 
DISCUSSION 
The most interesting, and least predictable of our results are those on homophily, which challenge 
received wisdom under many respects. Previous studies often portrayed homophily as a factor of 
differentiation, inducing formation of clusters with strong internal homogeneity of opinion and sharp 
dissimilarity between them. Yet homophily (interpreted here as value homophily, or similarity of 
opinions) emerges from our work as a facilitating factor for global consensus. Taken in isolation, it 
acts as an accelerated version of randomness, smoothing the progress of convergence towards the 
mean of the distribution of opinions. In conjunction with experience, it dramatically changes results in 
favor of consensus around the view of the most experienced agents. Especially when conditions of 
interaction become more complex or difficult, experience alone is insufficient to foster 
homogenization of opinions: it is only by adding homophily that this can happen. In some cases, the 
force of homophily combined with experience is enough to bring about a consensus; in other cases, it 
can at least reduce the degree of fragmentation of the system, inducing the formation of fewer separate 
clusters (two in the extreme case of polarization). The explanation of these apparently counter-
intuitive results depends on the whole set of inter-related circumstances at play, and interestingly for 
our purposes, changes what was known about the sheer effects of randomness and experience.  
Our other results are largely in line with both the agent-based and organizational literatures. More 
precisely, our outcomes under the random choice assumption mirror those that Deffuant et al. (2002) 
obtained under similar conditions (except turnover); and our experience-driven simulations in essence 
confirm the findings of a long and well-established tradition that has highlighted the role of seniority 
and tenure in organizations. Notice, however, that our results on experience depend on relatively loose 
conditions that do not require strict hierarchical rules: it suffices that members seek advice from those 
who are no less senior than themselves, a category that also includes same-seniority peers. What is 
more, a hierarchical structure valuing seniority does not per se produce transmission of shared 
understandings, since this result hinges upon a combination of interrelated factors. We also stress the 
importance of the latitude of acceptance of newcomers – in the context of an organization, one can 
interpret a setting with high latitude of acceptance as one where newcomers know little about what is 
the central topic of the organization and hence have no strong view on it; on the opposite a low 
latitude of acceptance, where newcomers are not easily influenced, may concern settings where the 
organization involves less specific knowledge that the newcomers already have, and in that context the 
point of view that was initially prevalent in the system is quickly erased.  
The simulations provide evidence that the tendency of opinions, represented as positions in the 
real interval [0; 1], to converge can be affected by networked interactions, agent attributes, and 
externally imposed constraints (particularly time factors). In particular, network formation rules may 
constrain influence so that it moves only from more to less senior agents. In such cases, a bias in 
opinion may persist for long after the initial advocates of that opinion have left the scene, a result that 
cannot be obtained under the simplifying assumption that network ties are formed randomly. More 
complex conditions may also sustain a biased opinion, though in conjunction with a (usually very 
different) alternative: again, this result does not emerge under sheer randomness. To further 
substantiate this point, notice that another way in which simulations may benefit the study of 
organizations relates to the Deffuant (2002) model itself: its representation of opinion as a continuous 
variable and the inclusion of the latitude of acceptance, functioning as a threshold below which 
influence cannot occur, support a refined view of opinion transmission that suits well the subtlety and 
sophistication of organizational contexts, and may open the way to further theoretical developments. 
On the other hand, ours is the first attempt to extend Deffuant’s approach to situations in which agents 
enter and exit the network. This property creates a form of implicit hierarchy based on time spent in 
the institution that may affect advisor selection, and we have shown that under given conditions, it 
yields different systemic outcomes, compared to the original model. 
Our study reveals that all three factors under study, namely advisor selection rule, initial latitude 
of acceptance of newcomers, and duration of membership (or turnover rate), affect the system. Only 
for certain values of parameters can an opinion be transmitted to newer generations of members; and 
some of the advisor selection criteria are inconsistent with any form of opinion transmission. Under 
realistic values of junior latitude and turnover rate, three different scenarios arise from our simulations: 
a first scenario is one in which all agents constitute one group with opinion around 0.5 – which means 
that there is convergence to a unique value without any historical impact of the initial value of the 
opinion of seniors; in a second scenario, all agents constitute one group with opinion significantly 
lower than 0.5 – which means that the initial value of the opinion of seniors has an effect over several 
generations (although such an effect fades away progressively in the very long run); and a third 
scenario is one in which two groups co-exist and newcomers are driven towards the one or the other 
depending on their initial opinion.  
It is important to notice that there is no unique way to attain any one of these three states in this 
system, which responds differently to different combinations of parameters. While random choice and 
homophily almost always drive the system towards the first scenario (consensus around the midpoint 
of the distribution), they may degenerate into a case of non-convergence for very low values of 
latitude of acceptance. Experience drives the system towards the second scenario (consensus around 
the initial opinion of seniors), but fails to achieve convergence for low values of latitude of 
acceptance, and yields polarization (third scenario) with longer durations. Combined with homophily, 
experience does better in that it achieves at least polarization with low latitude of acceptance, and 
consensus to the initial opinion of seniors, with long durations. Interestingly, these outcomes 
necessitate compound analyses – as is the case with any “complex system”.  
These results illuminate the social processes going on at the Commercial Court of Paris, the 
empirical case that inspired our work. Previous empirical research (Lazega et al. 2012) indicates that 
the dynamics of the advice network is driven by status, a notion that includes seniority as one of its 
key components and loosely corresponds to our experience, rather than by opinion homophily, and 
that the judges are often divided into opposing camps on essential judicial questions (Lazega et al. 
2012; Lazega et al. 2011). Our study reveals possible mechanisms through which, over the centuries-
long duration of activity of the Court, transmission of opinions driven by seniors’ primacy eventually 
gives rise to polarization. This result can account for the existing evidence, and could not have been 
obtained with any other methods, as available data are insufficient to allow detailed longitudinal 
statistical analyses of opinion change. Insight into the transmission of opinions at the Court is 
important to better understand how judges form their views on matters that will affect their judicial 
decision-making, with potential repercussions on the regulation of the economy.  
Admittedly, we have used stylized versions of the empirically thicker, and conceptually richer, 
research on the Commercial Court that initially inspired our thoughts. These simplifications have left 
aside numerous details – such as frequency of advice, noise in the communication process, other 
heterogeneities among judges. By stripping away these details, some readers may fear that – as any 
other simulation model – ours is too abstract to yield valid insights (Fine & Elsbach, 2000). Yet, such 
simplifications are helpful to bring to light the different patterns that emerge at the level of the system 
as a whole, from just a few basic assumptions at the individual and dyadic levels. The properties of the 
model reveal which combinations of conditions bring about the possible scenarios of consensus, 
polarization and fragmentation. In this sense, our work not only makes the case that insight from 
organization studies improves the reliability of computer simulations, but also the reverse –that agent-
based methods can widen the range and general applicability of organizational research findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Our model provides computational evidence that in an organization with a flow of entries and 
exits, social influence can explain convergence of opinions of members, even when those originally 
holding the opinion leave the organization at an early stage. The model brings to light the conditions 
under which convergence of opinions occurs as well as the factors underlying the emergence of 
different scenarios. Our results are not only consistent with existing knowledge, they also provide 
innovative insight into how different criteria of selection of network ties affect transmission of 
opinions throughout the system over time, even when assuming the same micro-level mechanism of 
dyadic influence in all cases.  
Our model was originally derived from the case study of a real-world organization, the 
Commercial Court of Paris; we have abstracted from its idiosyncrasies to highlight only its most 
generalizable features, those that are confirmed and documented in the wider organizational literature.  
Our findings shed new light on how organizations can smooth or expedite their internal processes of 
assimilation, transmission, and sharing of ideas or opinions. For example, they may find ways to 
facilitate exchanges and contact between like-minded members in order to reinforce some process of 
transmission of ideas that is already occurring due to experience-related factors, as often happens in 
organizational settings in which length of service matters.  
Possible extensions of our study can be theoretical and empirical. One could test the sensitivity of 
our results to changes in the size of the organization, which has been shown to be a key parameter in 
many influence models (Jager & Amblard, 2004). One could also consider a slightly different model 
of influence in which interactions not only draw agents’ opinions closer to each other, but may also 
drive them further apart if a negative influence takes place (as in Jager & Amblard, 2004). Another 
interesting extension could be to test a further selection criterion, such as centrality of agents – the idea 
that more sought-out agents are more likely to attract formation of new ties over time. 
We find that homophily has a very strong impact on the agents' opinions. One could thus enrich 
this construct through a more detailed representation of how homophily is experienced by individuals. 
Use of real-world organizational data may in particular relate homophily not only to (endogenous) 
opinion, but also to (exogenous) demographic factors such as gender, age, or nationality. Because 
diversity along demographic dimensions cannot be eliminated or reduced, we expect it to make overall 
convergence more difficult, further stressing the crucial role of value homophily alone in achieving 
consensus. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Final opinion of each agent (vertical axis) as a function of age (horizontal axis). 
Simulations with 200 agents, duration of 10 time-steps, initial opinion of senior agents of 0.2, 
initial latitude of acceptance of senior agents of 0.2, and initial latitude of juniors of 0.7. 
Results are taken after 50 time-steps, or 5 generations of agents. There are 20 agents for each 
level of age, which by definition varies between 1 and 10 (duration); at any one time, agents 
whose age is between 6 and 10 are seniors. The levels and dispersion of the opinions of those 
who are senior at the end of the simulation are the most meaningful indicators of whether 
there has been convergence, and if yes, to what values of opinion. 
 
 Figure 2: Evolution of mean opinion (dashes) and mean uncertainty (dots) of senior 
agents (vertical axis) over time (horizontal axis). Long-run simulations of 500 time-steps 
with 200 agents, membership duration of 10 time-steps, initial opinion of seniors of 0.2, initial 
latitude of acceptance of seniors of 0.2, latitude of acceptance of initial juniors and 
newcomers of 0.7. Agents whose age is between 6 and 10 are seniors. 
 
 
 Figure 3: Final opinion of each agent (vertical axis) as a function of age (horizontal axis). 
Simulations with 200 agents, duration of 10 time-steps, initial opinion of senior agents of 0.2, 
initial latitude of acceptance of senior agents of 0.2, and initial latitude of juniors of 0.4. 
Results are taken after 50 time-steps, or 5 generations. There are 20 agents for each level of 
age, and at any one time, agents whose age is between 6 and 10 are seniors. The levels and 
dispersion of the opinions of those who are senior at the end of the simulation are the most 
meaningful indicators of whether there has been convergence, and if yes, to what values of 
opinion. 
 
 
 Figure 4: Final opinion of each agent (vertical axis) as a function of age (horizontal axis), 
Simulations with 200 agents, duration of 20 and 50 time-steps respectively, initial opinion of 
senior agents of 0.2, initial latitude of acceptance of senior agents of 0.2, and initial latitude of 
juniors of 0.7. Results are taken after 50 time-steps in all cases. When duration is 20, age 
varies between 1 and 20, there are 10 agents for each level of age, and seniors are agents 
whose age is over 10. When duration is 50, age varies between 1 and 50, there are 4 agents for 
each level of age, and agents whose age is over 25 are seniors. The levels and dispersion of 
the opinions of those who are senior at the end of the simulation are the most meaningful 
indicators of whether there has been convergence, and if yes, to what values of opinion. 
TABLES 
Parameters Range of values  
Initial opinion of Junior agents U [0;1] 
Initial opinion of Senior agents 0.2 
Initial latitude of acceptance Junior agents 0.2 ; 0.3 ; 0.4 ; 0.5 ; 0.6; 0.7; 0.8 ; 0.9 
Initial latitude of acceptance Senior agents 0.2 
Number of agents 200 
Duration of membership (D) 2; 4 ; 8; 10 ; 20 ; 50 
ȝ 0.2 
Selection criteria Random, Homophily, Experience, 
Experience-Homophily 
Number of generations 5 ; 50 
Observed data  
Definition of Junior vs Senior agents  Length of stay < D / 2 vs > D/2 
Average opinion of Senior agents  
Opinion as a function of length of stay in the Court  
Sub-group differentiation 0.05 
Table 1: Parameters and indicators of the model. 
 Membership 
duration 
Random Homophily Experience Homophily + 
Experience 
 2 0.23 0.2 0.14 0.16 
 4 0.03 0.01 0.03 0 
Table 2: standard deviation of final senior opinions from the mean, for each selection criterion. 
Averages taken over 100 simulations for each combination of parameters. Durations of 2 and 4 
(turnover rate of 50 and 25 % respectively). The average opinion is always close to 0.5, in all these 
cases. 
 Membership duration 2 4 8 10 15 20 25 50 
Average Opinion 0.51 0.48 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Opinion st. dev. 0.14 0.03 0.002 0.01 0 0 0 0 
Latitude of acceptance 0.7 0.7 0.37 0.27 0.24 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Number of agents in 
discordant-opinion 
group 
0 0 0 0 7 (6.6%) 9 (9%) 6 (6%) 10 
(10%) 
Table 3: Effects of membership duration in experience simulations. Averages taken over 100 
simulations for each combination of parameters. For increasing maximum membership duration 
(lower turnover), the average values of opinion and latitude of acceptance tend to 0.2, and a group of 
agents with discordant opinion tend to appear. Recall that opinion and latitude of acceptance vary 
between 0 and 1 (0.2 being the value of both parameters for seniors at initialization), and the total 
number of agents is 200. 
 Membership duration 2 4 8 10 15 20 25 50 
Average Opinion 0.49 0.49 0.31 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Opinion st. dev. 0.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Latitude of acceptance 0.7 0.67 0.34 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Table 4: Effects of membership duration in homophily-experience simulations. Averages taken 
over 100 simulations for each combination of parameters. With higher maximum membership 
duration (lower turnover), the average values of opinion and latitude of acceptance tend to 0.2. Recall 
that opinion and latitude of acceptance vary between 0 and 1 (0.2 being the value of both parameters 
for seniors at initialization). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
